But not even that answers the question wholly. For even after the electoral results of 2005, Aoun could have gone back and been an active participant in the country's reformation in the image of the Cedar Revolution and the anti-Syrian struggle. But despite all the talk of Aoun's status as a fighter against Syrian occupation, two points have haunted the General:
1) It was, in fact, the assassination and political workings of Rafic Hariri, on an international level; along with Walid Jumblatt and the Qornet Shehwan [Christian] Gathering, organised with the blessings of the Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir; on an internal level, that had successfully ousted the Syrian regime from the country.
2) Aoun's own complicity in the devastating events which lead to his exile, the Syrian occupation, and the drafting of the Taef Accord document which he opposed and will therefore forever serve as a reminder of the destructive blunders he rendered onto the country in the early 1990s.
In continuing to block the government's formation, the game Aoun is playing is the same reactionary one as that of 2005. In effect, Aoun has no real desire to participate in this government on an executive level. Instead, the General is hoping that the formation of the government will take place in such a way as to provide him with the fuel to fire up his claim of Christian marginalization, providing him with the impetus for the protest-vote he once again hopes to reap, and garnering for the General the votes his behaviour over the last 3 years, opposed as it was to the national interests of the country's Christians, could never have given him.
That, at least, continues to be evidenced by every televised rant given by the General throughout this crisis and starting in Doha ahead of the precipitation of the government’s non-formation. The extent of this delusion, and the lengths to which Aoun intends to pursue it, are as yet unknown. Perhaps, as Ahmad Fatfat speculated several days ago, the General's logic has outlined to him a scenario in which he and his allies would obtain a two-thirds majority in the next election thereby allowing them to dismiss the recently-elected President (whom Aoun and his allies blocked for 6 months) and pushing Aoun onto the Presidential seat.
A seat from which the General could preside over the death of the International Tribunal - the undoubtable consequence of that pro-Syrian-Hizballah dominated Parliament - and allowing the General to finally witness the redemption he has so actively strived for, and cost our country so much, by erasing the legacy of the man who through his life/death brought about the end of our occupation.
And who knows, with everything going the General's way perhaps he might even be able to tackle that other persistent mark on his name, the Taef Accord - a task easily provided for, once again, by that pro-Syrian-Hizballah dominated parliament. Surely those parties would be able to find some sort of Accord more conducive to the long-term presence of their agents in all aspects of the country's political, cultural, social and military infrastructure.
As 2009 comes around, and the next Parliamentary elections with it, reality will provide a very real check to dreams of a sweeping victory for either camp. Nonetheless, the above scenario bares a chilling reminder of the consequences of a victory for the same forces that rampaged through Beirut, bombed the Mountain, and provided a valuable political cover for those violent and terroristic actions.
Whether the General will be successful in blocking the government’s formation until the 2009 elections is unclear, what is clear, however, is that if Aoun’s blustering crew do make it onto the cabinet they will most likely use their positions to engage in precisely the same nepotistic behaviour he and his followers have been so critical of [especially in reference to the late Rafic Hariri] and so guilty of engaging in themselves already.
Most likely 2009 will witness the emergence of a Presidential faction of Christian candidates more able [and perhaps more willing] to satisfy the tastes of the majority of middle of the road Christians disgusted with the Orange tsunami’s unacceptable [and frankly quite vulgar] attacks on the community’s leading prelate; his alliance and cover for a group that so obviously stands in the face of the community’s interests and long-term objectives; and the severe damage he has down to the institution of the presidency, and other institutions of the state since the return of his amicable relations with the regime that allowed him to live in a Parisian mansion for duration of those [unbearable] 15 years.